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Summary findings
The empirical literature on the effects of ownership has  wages, make production decisions, and appoint new
not distinguished between the effects of ownership and  managers.
the effects of control. It has also generally ignored the  Increasing profit-retention  rates and adopting
dynamic effects of various ownership and control  rights.  performance contracts - conventionally viewed as the
Using a rich set of panel data about changes in China's  most important reforms for China's state enterprises -
state-owned enterprises, Xu examines the static and  did not improve productivity much.
dynamic effects of decentralizing ownership and control  Overall, decentralization accounted for at least 42
rights.  percent of productivity growth in Chinese state
He finds that productivity and growth rates improved  enterprises in the 1980s. Much of that gain came from
significantly when reform improved the incentives for  improvements in the growth rate of productivity rather
managers and employees to learn and to work hard - than in improved levels of productivity.
for example, by decentralizing the rights to control
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Economists agree that the ownership of a firm affects its productivity. The theory
of the firm suggests that the productivity of a firm is affected by various ownership or
control rights: cash flow rights, internal incentives, managerial incentives, and production
decision rights (Holmtrom and Tirole, 1989).  Subsumed within this literature may be the
contract that firms sign with governments. Moreover, the recent surging literature on the
relationship between firm-specific human capital and growth suggests that it may also be
important to examine the dynamic effects of change in the organization of a firm (Lucas,
1988; Romer, 1986). The empirical literature on the relationship between ownership and
productivity, however, has not caught up: it is almost exclusively of static nature, and the
ownership variables are usually represented by dummy variables such as private (or state)
ownership, collectives, etc (Boardman and Vining,  1989). An exception is Ehrlich et al.
(1994): they analyze the dynamic effects of private versus state ownership, find that state
ownership is associated with lower growth rates, and suggest that it is because private
ownership facilitates the accumulation of firm-specific human capital.
This paper continues this direction by examining the effects of ownership on both
productivity levels and growth rates.  Controlling for specific features of ownership, I
focus on the effects of decentralized control rights and cash flow rights on growth. In
particular, I consider how changes in ownership and control rights affect both SOEs
productivity levels and growth rates.  Among these changes are appointing new
managers, delegating production autonomy to managers, reducing the share of output
under the government's plan, using performance contract and firm-level pay sensitivity,
and allowing the managers to determine wages of employees. This rich description of
ownership and control, seldom tried in the literature, is available for a panel data set of
Chinese SOEs.
IIn the panel data set we observe the timing  of each of the reforms.  We can use the
before-after changes in productivity and their trends to identify the level and growth
effects of a reform. Sufficient cross-section and time-series variation arises because the
Chinese government adopted a decentralized attitude toward reforns;  as a result, each
reform was implemented at different time, and firms in different provinces, cities,
industries, or governed by different levels of government, could experience distinct
timing for the same reforms.
A natural byproduct of this analysis is an examination of the reasons behind
changes in productivity of Chinese SOEs.  Though there is abundant literature studying
this question, to the best of my knowledge, nobody has examined such a rich set of
changes in ownership and control in China, and nobody has studied their dynamic effects.
The empirical analysis offers many insights into the relationship between
ownership, control and productivity.  We find that, when decentralized reforms improve
the incentives of the managers and the employees to work hard and learn, productivity
improves sizably: appointing new managers improved the productivity growth rate for
county-governed and province-governed SOEs by roughly 6% annually; the delegation
of production decisions improved productivity levels by 6.7%, and growth rates by 2.6%;
the decentralization of wage determination rights improved productivity levels by 7.6%,
and growth rates by 3.4%. The adoption of the Contract Responsibility System and the
increase of profit retention rates, conventionally thought the most important of the
Chinese SOE reforms, are found to be least effective. The findings are robust with respect
to the choices of production function form and of deflators, the use of value added or the
gross value of output as the outcome measure, and the endogeneity of some important
variables. The findings confirm the notion that a decentralized reform is likely to work
when it inspires incentives to work hard and learn.
H.  THE DECENTRALIZED REFORMS
2This research uses A Survey of State Enterprises:  1980--1989, a retrospective survey
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 1991.  The data set is a balanced
panel design: no firms were dropped out during the 10 years. 3 Survey questionnaires
were sent out by the provincial System Reform Commissions to 800 state enterprises.
Valid responses from  769 firms, located in 21 cities in  four provinces of  China
(Sichuan, Jiangsu, Jilin, and Shanxi), were received. The data set was not designed to be a
random sample of the state enterprises: making up more than 70% of the sample, large
firms were over-represented. The median firm of the sample had 931 employees.
The data set consists of two parts. Part one, intended to be completed by the
accountant of the firm, contains quantitative tables with details of the firm's production
inputs, outputs, internal incentives, wages, labor composition, and profit distributions
between the govenmment  and the  firn.  Part two, to be completed by the manager,
contains information on the firm's industry affiliation, age, and size; the contract terms of
the manager; the relationship of the firm to the government;  when the firm was granted
the discretion to plan output levels and what to produce, whether the manager had the
discretion to determine wages; the share of the firm's input from subsidized state sources,
from the market, and from bartering with other firms, etc. It also has information about
how value added was distributed, and how the decentralized reforms evolved over time.
During  the  1980s, the  Chinese  government  experimented with  decentralizing
SOEs to boost productivity. By the end of the decade, those state enterprises had a much
different  legal  structure, and  became  much  more,  though  not  completely,  market-
oriented. 4
Both the productivity level and input uses of firms changed over this period. The
average labor productivity of the firms in the data set increased at 2.6% annually.
2This data set has been used by many other authors, including Groves et al. (1994, 95).
3In the  1980s the Chinese SOEs did not face a real threat of bankruptcy.
4See  Johnson (1990), Tidrick et al. (1987), Perkins (1994), and Jefferson and Rawski (1994) for  more thorough
coverage of industrial  reforns and the rural reformns  of China.
3Employment in firms grew much faster than capital stock. The employment of state
enterprises increased at a rate of 3.5% per year, while the capital-labor ratio remained
largely unchanged.
The management and property rights of state enterprises changed dramatically
over the 1980s. At the beginning of the 1980s, both control and  ownership belonged to
the state:  all profits were turned over to the state, and the entire investment fund, wage,
and collective welfare expenditures were allocated by the state.  The managers, therefore,
did not have autonomy over production decisions and wage determination. State
enterprises were largely managed by bureaucrats, and since there was no link between
performance and reward, the employees and managers did not have incentives to
improve.
Over the 1980s the Chinese govemrnment  partially and gradually decentralized
ownership and control rights. Setting the stage for these reforms, the government opened
up the market: after SOEs had fulfilled their mandatory output quota delivered to the
state, the government allowed them to sell their output to the market. Besides obtaining
them at subsidized state prices, firms could also purchase inputs from the market. 5
Between 1980 and 89, the share of material inputs purchased through the market rose
from 32% to 59%, and the share of output sold on the market went up from 49% to 60%
(Dong 1992). At the meantime, SOEs faced increasing competition from the non-state
sector: in 1980, collective and other non-state-owned industries accounted for 21% of
gross value of industrial output; by 1991 this figure had risen to 47% (Perkins 1994).
Opening the market and enhancing competition were necessary for other reforms to be
effective. The next subsection describes the changing nature of reform during this
increasingly competitive periods.
5It was called  dual price system in China, where market and state prices coexist. The government  limited the
amount  of subsidized inputs a SOE could obtain, beyond which the SOE had to resort to the market at higher
prices. See Perkins (1994), Johnson  (1990).
4Trends in Reform
1. Decentralizing cash flow rights by increasing profit retention rates. The average
marginal retention rate  rose from 11% in 1980, to 17% in 1984, and 27% in 1989. The
variation across firms and over time was substantial.  A firm could use the retained
profit to invest, improve collective welfare (such as housing and firm-owned schools), or
pay employees a bigger bonus. However, the manager could only use retained profits
subject to many constraints such as a bonus cap, a very high progressive tax rate, or
increasing dependency on self-financing for capital investment, for which the government
was previously fully responsible. Note that the marginal retention rate at year t was set at
the end of year t-I; as a result, it presents less of a problem in identification because it can
be considered as pre-determined.
2. Autonomy of production decisions. At the beginning of the 1980s the
government controlled most of the production plans of the state enterprises. Over the
decade  it gradually granted some firms more autonomy in production decisions,
concentrating on six areas: value of output, physical quantity of output, choices of
product, technology, production scheduling, and exports.7 The proportion of autonomous
firms increased from 7% in 1980 to 25%  in 1984, 53% in 1987, and 67% in 1989.
Another aspect of the autonomy of firms in production decisions was the decrease of the
6The  marginal profit retention rate is the share of (profit minus base profit) that a SOE retains. The base
profit amount was subject to a base profit retention rate, determined ex ante by the government (at the end
of last year). In this paper, the base retention rate is treated as a lump sum transfer to a finm.
7These areas of production decisions were delegated around the same time, with the exception of production
scheduling, which came earlier, and exports autonomy, which came later.
5Table 1. Trends of the Decentralized Reforms in the 1980s
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89
Marginal retention rate  .11  .12  .11  .14  .17  .17  .19  .23  .26  .27
Autonomy of production decisions  .07  .08  .10  .14  .25  .35  .40  .53  .64  .67
Share of output under mandatory  Not available  .64  .62  .60  .58  .57  .57
plan of the govermnent
Share of finrs  with wage discretion  .01  .01  .01  .02  .05  .09  .12  .20  .32  .35
Share of fims  under Contract  .00  .00  .00  .01  .02  .04  .08  .42  .83  .88
Responsibility System
Ex ante firm-level pay sensitivity  Too few observations  .51  .39  .41  .46  .43  .42
for firms under CRS
Share offirms  with management  .09  .01  .06  .10  .16  .14  .07  .15  .10  .09
turnover  I
Note.  All numbers come from the author's  computation based on A Survey of State Enterprises: 1980-89.
share of output under the government's mandatory plan,  8which was reduced from 64% in
1984 to 57% in 1989 for the firms in our sample.
3. More discretion for managers of state enterprises to determine employees'
wages. Traditionally the government set an employee's wage as an almost deterministic
function of his or her age, education, location, tenure and gender, leaving managers with
little leverage to induce employee effort.  This was reinforced by the employment
guarantee. 9 To give more discretionary power to managers of state enterprises, the
Chinese government granted some firrns managerial wage discretion,'0 controlling only
the growth rate or aggregate amount of wages for the firm. The proportion of firms with
the managerial wage discretion mainly increased in the latter 1980s: from 0.5% in 1980,
to 5% in 1984, 20% in 1987, and 35% in 1989.
8A  state enterprise's  output  fell into three categories:  mandatory plan by the government,  which was set up by the
government and must be fulfilled, directive plan that was suggested by the government, and own plan which
was under the discretions  of the manager.
9Part of the  reason was  that the "fall-back  position" for the fired employees would be quite unattractive: it was
very difficult for the gurantee  to find jobs outside the incumbent firm due to a rigid labor  market; in addition,
since the social security  and welfare function were carried out by the state enterprises  rather than the market or
the state, the dismissed  employees  would lose much of their firm-specific  benefits  such as housing, tenure wage,
pension plan if they left the incumbent  firms.
10It is called a firm-specific wage scheme in the questionaire.
64. Contract Responsibilitv System (CRS) and linking wage increase with profit
increas."  The counterpart to the Household Responsibility System of the Chinese
agricultural reform,12  CRS was probably intended to be the most dramatic reform for the
state enterprises. Under a CRS contract, the manager had the legal right to operate the
firm, and was granted some discretion to make decisions within the firm for an agreed
duration, usually 3--4 years.'3 Typically, a CRS contract  specified the distribution of
value added between the state and the firm, the performance requirements such as the
minimum annual expenditure on capital maintenance, the number of new products to be
developed, the volume of output and its price to be delivered to the state, the dependence
of  CEO compensation on the performance of the firm, and the ex ante firm-level wage
elasticity with respect to profit.  Note that this aggregate pay sensitivity existed only when
the firm  was under  the CRS.
Most firms adopted  CRS only  after  1986.  There  was virtually  no firm with  a CRS
contract  in 1980, only 2% of them  in  1984, but  42% in  1987, and  88% in 1989.
5.  Increasing  management  turnover.  The share of firms with management
turnover  generally  increased  over the decade,  especially  in  1983-85 and  1987-1989.  The
increase,  however,  is by no means  smooth:  it was 9% and 6% in 1980 and  1982, then
jumped  to 16% and  14% in 1984  and  1985;  it dropped  to 7% in 1986,  then  increased  to
15% in 1987, dropped  again  to  10% and 9%  in  1988 and  1989.
III.  HYPOTHESES  OF THE  EFFECTS  OF DECENTRALIZATION
itAll  information  about CRS is from  CRS in Practice, complied by the Research  Group for The Chinese Firm
System Reform.
12Lin (1993), McMilan et al. (1987) attributed the unprecedented increase of farmning  productivity in China in
the first half of the 1980s largely  to the adoption of the household responsibility  system.
13Usually, the contract for a firm  implementing  CRS was signed by the industrial  bureau,  which  was a branch
of government  in charge of the industrial state enterprises,  or some representatives  of the firm, along with the
manager--the winner among bidders for the contract. The winner of the bid was determined by a committee
representing the government,  and sometimes also the employees  of the firm.
7This section discusses how the productivity  level and growth rate of SOEs will be
affected by the discussed reformns. Consider a principal-agent relationship between the
government and the manager (and between a manager and his employees). In what
follows I shall argue that the decentralized reforms increase the payoff of effort and
learning of managers and SOE employees in comparison with in the centralized status
quo, therefore affect the productivity level and growth rate. The underlying premise is
summarized in lemma 1.
Lemma 1. (1) When a reform raises the reward for efforts of either the manager or
the employees,  the firm-level efforts increase; as a result, the productivity level shifts up.
(2) When a reform raises the reward for skills (therefore learning activity) of either the
manager or his representative employee, the firm-level human capital increases; as a
consequence, the productivity growth of the firm increases.
Lemma I can be easily justified by a commonly-used production fumction  where
the value added is increasing in firm-level skills and efforts besides conventional factors
like capital and labor (Jensen and Meckling,  1979; Ehrlich et al., 1994). Lemma I is
sufficient to allow us consider how each of the reforms will affect productivity.
Marginal Profit Retention Rate. When the rate increases, the employees and
managers envision a higher payoff for their efforts, which induces them to work harder.
However,  since the government re-adjusts the rate on an annual basis, there is no
guarantee that the manager or employees can capture higher future returns for learning.
So a higher marginal retention rate at period t raises the payoff of efforts, but not
necessarily the payoff of learning; by lemma 1, the productivity level increases but not
necessarily its growth rate.
Hypothesis 1. A higher marginal retention rate will lead to a higher productivity
level but not necessarily a higher growth rate.
The Decentralization of Wage Controls  It involves two reforms: a firm-level pay
sensitivity (as a part of CRS specifications), and the managerial wage discretion. Both
8should raise the payoffs of efforts and of skills of employees. However, the two have a
few important differences.
Though the incentive effects of firm-level pay sensitivity might be hindered by
the free-riding problem (i.e., all employees benefit from the increased effort of an
individual employee), "peer monitoring" partly restores the positive incentives associated
with this aggregate pay sensitivity. In team interactions, low effort input of a member
reduces wage incomes of other members since it is hard for the manager to distinguish
each member's productivity; presumably, however, a member's effort that is
unobservable to the manager can be observed by other members. As a result of the
negative externality of shirking of members, all have the incentive to monitor others. So
the firm-level pay sensitivity could be effective in raising efforts of employees, and,
therefore, the productivity level. But it is unlikely to encourage employees to improve
their skills and thus raise the growth rate of the firm. The most important reason is that a
team member has little incentive to improve his skills: without labor market competition
and without the possibility of being fired, personal payoffs are largely insensitive to skill
acquisition.  In addition, it is much more difficult to monitor other members in improving
skills: learning efficiency is highly heterogeneous; thus the time spent on learning is a
poor proxy of learning.
In contrast, the managerial wage discretion is much more effective in raising the
productivity growth rate.  This discretion allows the manager to reward an individual
based on his  productivity, and, therefore, effectively rewards both his efforts and his
skills. Note that without the presence of a negative externality the managerial wage
discretion involves no peer monitoring.
Hypothesis 2. The increase of firm-level pay sensitivity will raise the productivity
level but is less effective in spurring the growth rate;  in contrast, the delegation of
managerial wage discretion will raise both the productivity level and the grow rate.
9The decentralization of production decisions. When production decision rights
shift from planning bureaus to managers, the quality of decision making changes, because
managers have better knowledge of the technology and demand, and stronger incentives
than the bureaucrats. Managers have a larger stake in firm outcomes than bureaucrats:
bureaucrats' economic well-being is largely independent of how an enterprise fares, while
the manager has a direct stake in the firm's  outcomes--managers in poorly-performing
firms were more likely to be replaced (Xu, 1996), and CEO pay-sensitivity was
significantly related to its firm performance.14  As a consequence, as the payoff to
managerial efforts and skills go up, we expect a higher productivity level and growth rate.
Due to better incentives and proximity to the firm, managers have better
knowledge about the technology, market demand, and personnel.  When production
decisions are decentralized, therefore, they will reflect the higher quality of decision
making by the managers.
Hypothesis 3. When the government delegates production decision rights to
managers, payoffs to efforts and skills increase, which causes both the productivity level
and its growth rate to increase; better skills and the information advantage of managers
over bureaucrats are at the core of improvements stemming from production
decentralization.
Appointing new managers. His predecessor's  firing should signal to the new
manager a more credible threat of losing his position if he does a poor job. Since losing
the management job incurs a certain loss of income and reputation in the managerial labor
market, we expect the new manager to have incentives to work harder and invest more
time in improving skills than do incumbent managers. He may also want to invest in
skills because the government evaluates a manager based on observations of outcomes of
many years, a time frame allowing ample room for the skill improvement to be reflected
1 4In our sample,  the elasticity  of CEO  pay to average value  added is 0.14.
10in outcome improvements. Though the firm's  growth rate may eventually improve due to
better learning incentives, the new manager may not on average improve productivity
level in the year he takes over the post: he will likely spend a significant amount of time
of his first year to learn about firm-specific aspects about the job.
Hypothesis 4.  Compared to a firm with an incumbent manager, ceteris paribus, a
firm under a new manager will have a higher productivity growth rate; it will not
necessarily have a productivity level boost due to adjustment costs.
The adoption of Contract Responsibility System.  As noted, the CRS includes
firm-level pay sensitivity and additional contract specifications. Having discussed the
effects of firm-level pay sensitivity, here I shall only discuss how the additional contract
specifications will affect productivity; for convenience, when I refer to CRS I mean the
CRS specifications except the pay sensitivity part.
A CRS contract, falling into the category of  performance contract, cannot
improve productivity universally. For example, a performance contract will not work if it
does not reduce information advantage of managers, if it does not improve the firm's
incentives, and if it is not credible (World Bank, 1995). A CRS contract is typically
assigned by the government without using competitive methods; as a result, its
information disadvantage relative to managers is not reduced.  The manager's
information advantage, in turns, allows him to manipulate the performance targets so that
they are easy to reach. Worse yet, CRS does not offer firms a systematical "carrotf
(besides firn-level pay sensitivity), nor a "stick" -- there was no bankruptcy for SOEs in
the 1  980s. The performance targets tend to be numerous with respect to profit, capital
maintenance, labor, and product innovations. When the manager faces many constraints
regarding inputs and pursues multiple output targets, he is more likely to operate as if
under a state plan than like an independent commercial firm, which single-mindedly
pursues profits.
11Besides these static aspects that limit the effectiveness of CRS, the lack of long-
term commitment from both the government and the firm further renders CRS contracts
ineffective in improving growth. A CRS contract usually lasts for three to five years, not
long enough to internalize iong-term investment. The government, moreover, used the
CRS as an experiment, not a permanent policy instrument. Finally, SOEs have a tendency
to sacrifice their potential long-term benefits for myopic gains: (a) Firm-level pay
sensitivity rewards current profits, which further reduces incentives to invest, and  (b) Xu
(1996)  found that better firms were given lower base amounts of transfers including less
investmnent  subsidies. This may produce "ratchet effects", that is, SOEs under CRS may
mimic inefficiency by not working hard so that they get easy performance targets.
Hypothesis 5. Except the effects of firm-level pay sensitivity, the adoption of CRS
will, on average, improve neither productivity level nor the growth rate. The adoption of
CRS may affect growth rate negatively.
IV.  EMPIRICAL  IMPLEMENTATION
All variables used are constructed from A Survey of State Enterprises: 1980-1989.
Some variables have many missing observations, and each of them has a different set of
missing observations. In the empirical analysis, we delete observations where: (1) the
dependent variable is missing; (2) capital intensity, the key conventional explanatory
variable, is missing; (3) and some key variables are unreasonable outliers. 15 The sample,
now an unbalanced panel, consists of  716 firms  and a total of  6712 Observations. To
avoid losing too much of the sample and to make full use of the information in the data,
we impute the value of missing observations of a generic variable xi, by  giving them the
'5We consider an observation to be an outlier when its value seems unreasonable, for example, when the
marginal retention rate is negative or larger than  1.
12average values of their observed (industry, year, province, governance status) cell.  1 6 In
addition, we create a dummy variable m_x-,  whose value is 1 if x,, is missing for firm i
and year t.  Then, the coefficient of m_xi,  measures the differences in average productivity
between firm-years with missing xi, and those without. The incidence of missing
observations for each variable is contained in table A. 1 of the appendix. The definitions
of the variables are contained in table 2.
Here we estimate how the decentralized reforms affected both the level and
growth rate of productivity, and we conduct growth-accounting to explore the relative
importance of each reform behind the productivity improvement of state enterprises.
Empirical Production Function
To estimate how the decentralized reforms affected  productivity of state enterprises, we
estimate a Cobb-Douglas-typed "institutionalized production function" 17:
In(avg. value added) = bo + Ej  reformj [baj  + b2i (years since reformj in effect)]
+ b3ln(k)  + b4 ln(L) +  k b 5 k (share of jobk) + b6 (input price index)
+  , b7,  (time  -invariant  dummy,) + Et  bs,  (year  -t dummy)  + u;,
where jobk can be the share of engineers, of management personnel, and of "other
employees." Firm-specific dummy variables consist of dummies related to a firm's
industry affiliation, governance status (by central, provincial, prefecture, and county
government), and province. u%,  is the unobservable. Note that some reforms are not
assumed to affect growth rate hence some by's  are 0.
16See  Greene (1990), p288-289 for the discussion of how to deal with missing observations.
1 7See  Coase  (1992),  Jensen and  Meckling  (1979),  McMillan et  al  (1989) for justification  of  the
"institutionalized  production  function."
13Table 2. The Definitions of Some Variables
Average value  Total value added of a firm divided by the total number of employees, deflated by
added  the price index of the firm's  output price.
MARGINAL_RATE  The marginal profit retention rate at year t, set before the year begins.
AUTONOMY  A dummy variable whose value is I in all years after the government delegates
production decision rights to the manager of a firm in several areas
AUTONOMY_  A dummy variable whose value is I  if a firm eventually had autonomy within the
EVENTUALLY  period, and did not in the year t, 0 otherwise.
SPLANQUAN  The share of  a firm's  output under  the government's  mandatory  plan. Another
measure of the extent of decentralization of production decisions.
W_DISCRETION  A dummy variable that is I when the manager of a firm had managerial wage
discretion.
W_DISCRETION_  A dummy variable that is I when the firm did not have managerial wage
EVENTUALLY  discretion in year t but eventually did, 0 otherwise.
CRS  A dummy variable that is I when the firm was under Contract Responsibility
System  in the considered year
CRS_EVENTUALLY  A dummy variable that  is  1 when the  firm did not adopt CRS at the  year t but
eventually did, 0 otherwise.
W_ELASTICITY  ex ante  wage  elasticity  with  respect  to  profit at the  firm level, fixed after the
adoption of CRS.
New management  four dummy variables  whose values  are  1  's  if a firm had a  new manager--any
variables  manager  appointed  after  1980--at  the  year  and  was  govemed  by  central,
provincial, prefecture, and county government, respectively.
Labor quantity (L) and  Labor quantity is measured  by the number of employees of the firm, and its
its quality  quality by the share of employees as engineers, the share as management
personnel, and the share as "other employees"' 8. Since all firms in the sample are
in manufacturing, the share of engineers should be a good proxy for human
capital level.
FIRM AGE  Used to measure  the  learning-by-doing  experience  of  a  firm  (Bahk  and  Gort
1994).
k  The average of  fixed capital  stock  in the  beginning of this  and the  next  year,
deflated by finn-specific output prices.
INPUT_PRICE  An index that measures the average input price of a firm relative to market input
prices (which were normalized to 1).  The lower this index, the more subsidized
the firm's input was, and the higher should be its average value added.
l  Engineers is an abbreviation  of engineering  and technical personnel which  refers  to those  employees  with
technological knowledge. We  assume they are skilled workers. In this data set, they have higher  schooling
levels than other categories  of employees.  Management personnel  is a synonym  for bureaucrats  at thefirm,
who include officials  of communist  parties, unions ( not with real power in any sense-they may occasionally
hold some entertainment  or sports event), and managers and clerks of different  departments  of the firm, etc.
Other employees are those that are not involved in regular work throughout  the entire  year due to absenteeism,
illness, and leave,  among other  reasons.
14Identification Issues
One immediate complication is that since socialist firms do not face complete markets,
the inter-firm productivity difference measured by average value added may merely
reflect differences in output and input prices rather than real productivity.  However,
Chinese SOEs did face active markets for both inputs and products, as discussed earlier.
In addition, industry, governance, year and firm dummies should be able to filter out
most of the price measurement error,  because the deviation of state-imposed price from
market price was likely industry-, governance-, year-, and firm-specific.
Another objection might be the inconsistency caused by omitting variables. We
recognize that some important characteristics of the firms are not specified in the
production function but should be; to the extent we can, we include proxies for them in
the regression. One such characteristic is labor quality.  Chinese state enterprises had an
extremely low turnover rate due to their de facto  no firing constraint, which induced high
labor quality correlation over time. The inclusion of firm dummies should mitigate the
problem.  Another characteristic is the extent of market power or scale economies, the
effects of which on productivity will be correlated over time; the inclusion of firm and
industry dummies should alleviate the problem.  Another important omitted characteristic
may be implicit subsidies a firm received--including the firm-specific differential of
planned price--for which we have no measurement. The more subsidy a firm received, the
higher value added the firm should achieve ceteris paribus.  We account for the omitted
variable problem for the implicit subsidy as we did with price measurement error: we
include industry-, govemance-, firm-, and year-specific dummy variables, which should
15mitigate the omitting variable problem associated with labor quality and scale economies.
The dummy variables should filter out most of the systematic component of the subsidy
because: (a) the subsidy levels across industries differ systematically; (b) firms governed
by lower-levels of government enjoy lower levels of subsidy, because local governments
tended to impose harder budget constraints on firms. (c) The government adjusted
subsidy levels several times over the decade; the macro effects on subsidy should,
therefore, be filtered out by the year dunmmies,  and  (d) to a large extent a high subsidy-
recipient would remain so throughout the decade, especially after netting out the annual
trend--firm dummies should, therefore, filter out the average subsidy the firm received.
The most thorny objection is that the estimates of reform effects could be
inconsistent because the reform variables are endogenous:  they perhaps are the results of
maximizing choices of the government or firms (simultaneity or selection bias). For
instance, CRS status could be a result of self-selection  by a firm: the firm accepts CRS
only if it is better off with the adoption.  19 Also the government might bail out firms in
financial trouble by granting them favorable institutional arrangements.
One way to deal with the simultaneity bias problem of reform variables is the
control function method.20  Specifically,  decompose ui, into a firm-specific effect Xi  and
time-varying white noise nit  such that ui, = 0 i + j j,  . Suppose the simultaneity bias arises
because 4i is correlated with reforms. If we can find a function of observed variables to
substitute for the unobserved fixed effects, p 1 , the control function will capture the
'9As noted by Tidrick  et al. (1987), the Chinese  state enterprise  sector was a "bargained  economy": for example,
target  performances  and the tax rates of the firm are bargainable.
20See Heckman  and Hotz (1986) for an application  of  the control  function  method.
16component of u,, that is correlated with reforms variables. Xu (1996) found that the
decentralized reforms were selectively assigned across firms and time.  For instance,
firms with better previous performance tended to adopt CRS, while less fortunate firms
tended to receive a higher amount of transfer. It therefore appears that the sample of firms
that eventually underwent reformj  is a sample distinct from those that did not have
reformj  eventually, and thus we assume a reasonable control function for the
unobservable is linear in the "eventually" variables:
Zi={AUTONOMY_EVENTUALLY, CRS_EVENTUALLY,
W_DISCRETION_EVENTUALLY} (Definitions in table 2).
This choice of control function appears to make sense. We estimate a production
function with and without Z,, and examine which specification fits the data better.  The
results without Zi are presented in  column (2) and column (5) of table 3, those without
are not reported. We reject decisively the null hypothesis that the coefficients of selection
bias controls are all zero. Therefore Z 1 should be included in the production functions to
control for the firm-specific heterogeneity. We also attempted to control for sample
control dummies related to management changes, but we decide to not include them
because they offered little explanatory power-- none were significant, a result not
surprising, perhaps, since the vast majority of the firms had changed their managers over
the decade.
Effects of Decentralized Reforms. Empirical Estimates
We estimate a series of production  function to study how the decentralized reforms
affected average value added. The results are presented in table 3. In the level
17Table 3.  The Effects of Decentralized Reforms for Chinese SOEs (1980--89)
Dependent Variable=ln(Value Added Per Employee)
Variables  The Level Model  The Growth Model
(2) OLSa  (3)  FEb  (4)  RE  (5)  OLS  (6) FE  (7) RE
ln(k)  0.404***  0.303***  0.319***  0.404***  0.305***  0.321***
(0.014)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.017)
In(number of employees)  0.012  -0.056  0.027  0.011  -0.089**  0.019
(0.012)  (0.045)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.045)  (0.023)
Share of management personnel  -0.533***  -0.240  -0.308  -0.555*** -0.237  -0.309
(0.203)  (0.254)  (0.232)  (0.203)  (0.253)  (0.231)
Share of engineers  1.588***  -0.141  0.484  1.620***  -0.100  0.524
(0.269)  (0.362)  (0.323)  (0.268)  (0.361)  (0.323)
Share of "other workers"  -0.140  -0.359  -0.281  -0.126  -0.274  -0.210
(0.147)  (0.242)  (0.205)  (0.147)  (0.241)  (0.205)
Firm age  0.018***  0.049***  0.023***  0.018***  0.043***  0.022r
(0.001)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.013)  (0.003)
(Firm age) 2 0.000***  -0.001 ***  0.000***  0.000***  -0.001***  0.000***
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
INPUT  PRICE: the average input price  -0.192**  -0.079  -0.071  -0.199**  -0.092  -0.085
relative to  the market input price  (0.090)  (0.077)  (0.076)  (0.090)  (0.077)  (0.076)
Marginal profit retention rate  0.114**  0.109**  0.118**  0.112**  0.109**  0.117**
(0.047)  (0.055)  (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.051)
Dummy: AUTONOMY_EVENTUALLY  -0.088*  -0.1 14**
(0.048)  (0.048)
Dummy: autonomy  0.045**  0.101***  0.110***  0.019  0.060**  0.067***
(0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.025)
autonomy * year  0.009  0.029***  0.026***
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)
S_PLANQUAN  0.049  -0.154*** -0.135***  0.039  -0.167***  -0.148***
(0.035)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.033)
Dummy: W_DISCRETION_EVENTUALLY  -0.021  -0.023
(0.045)  (0.045)
Dummy:W_DISCRETION,  managerialwagediscretion  0.163***  0.147***  0.156***  0.077  0.076**  0.082**
(0.030)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.049)  (0.036)  (0.036)
W_DISCRETION * year  0.034**  0.034***  0.035***
(0.015)  (0.012)  (0.012)
Dummy: CRS_EVENTUALLY  0.195***  0.193***
(0.064)  (0.065)
Dummy: CRS  0.026  -0.004  -0.001  0.029  0.018  0.027
(0.044)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.053)  (0.039)  (0.040)
CRS * year  0.003  -0.022  -0.020
(0.019)  (0.016)  (0.016)
18Table 3 (Cont'd)
Variables  The Level  Model  The Growth  Model
OLS  FE  RE  OLS  FE  RE
W_ELASTICITY:  Firm-level pay sensitivity  0.289***  0.155***  0.143***  0.274***  0.131***  0.118**
(0.060)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.060)  (0.048)  (0.048)
Dummy  (central_NewMan): the firn had a new  manager -0.140*  *  0.006  -0.011  -0.036  0.074  0.062
& was govemed  by the central gov't  (0.061)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.092)  (0.065)  (0.066)
central_NewMan * year  -0.028  -0.005  -0.013
(0.020)  (0.015)  (0.015)
Dummy (province_NewMan): the firm  had a new  0.134**  0.102**  0.128***  -0.023  -0.007  -0.002
manager  & was governed  by aprovincial  gov't  (0.059)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.095)  (0.066)  (0.067)
province_NewMan  * year  0.053**  0.064***  0.063***
(0.024)  (0.018)  (0.018)
Dummy (prefeture NewMan):  the firm  had a new  -0.045*  -0.032  -0.042*  -0.061*  -0.028  -0.038
manager & was  govemed  by aprefecture  gov't  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.025)  (0.025)
prefecture_NewMan  * year  0.007  0.022***  0.013**
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)
Dummy (countyNewMan):  the firm  had a new  manager 0.039  -0.010  0.021  -0.099  -0.I11 *  -0.101
& was  govemed  by a county gov't  (0.057)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.086)  (0.063)  (0.063)
countv_NewMan  * year  0.041**  0.066***  0.061***
(0.019)  (0.016)  (0.015)
R Square  0.330  See note c  0.332  See note c
Sample Size  6544  6544  6544  16544  6544  6544
Source.--  Based  on A Survey  of State Enterprises:  1980-1989.
a In all OLS and RE estimations of this table (column 2, 4, 5, and 7), we also control the following
variables: 9 year dummies, 3 provincial dummies, 9 industry dummies, 4 governance dummies (the firm
governed by the central, provincial, city, county government), and the missing indicators for
W_ELASTICITY, marginal retention rate, and share of output under the mandatory plan of the
government.
b In all fixed effects estimations of this table (column 3, 6), we also control the following
variables: 9 year dummies, and missing indicators for firm-level pay sensitivity, marginal retention rate,
and share of output under the mandatory plan of the government.
C  For the level model: (1) the F statistic for FE vs. OLS is 14.8 with a P value of 0.000; (2) the
Breusch-Pagen test statistic for RE vs. OLS is 6224 with a P value of 0.000; (3) the Hausman (chi square)
test statistic for FE vs. RE is 386.5  with a P value of 0.000. For the growth model: (1) the F statistic for FE
vs. OLS is 15.01 with a P value of 0.000; (2) the Breusch-Pagen test statistic for RE vs. OLS is 6288 with a
P value of 0.000; (3) the Hausman (chi square) test statistic for FE vs. RE is 271.9 with a P value of 0.000.
specification(columns  2 to 4), reforms  are assumed  to have level effects  only. In the
growth specification (columns 5 to 7), besides level effects the reforms are assumed to
have a impact on the growth rate of the firm: we allow the grow rate of a firm to depend
19on the dummies for managerial  wage discretion,  production autonomy, CRS
participation, and new management.
Specification tests for both models indicate that the FE models fit the data best.
To investigate whether the reforms affected the productivity growth rate, we test the null
that the time-interacting terms in the growth model are jointly 0.  This hypothesis is
rejected at any reasonable significance level for the OLS, FE, and RE specifications. We
conclude that the reforms did enhance the firn-specific grow rate, and that the discussion
of empirical results should focus primarily on the growth model, especially its fixed
effects specification.
The increase of the marginal retention rate improved productivity level. In both
models, this result seem to be quite robust: a 10% increase of marginal retention rate
would improve the value added per capita by roughly 1.  1%. We also have evidence
indicating that the marginal retention rates did not affect the growth rate: in three
exploratory regressions (OLS, FE, and RE specifications) in which the average marginal
retention rate was interacted with time, the interaction terms were all insignificant. These
findings support hypothesis 1: a higher marginal retention rate raises the level but not the
growth rate of productivity.
AUTONOMY improved both the productivity level and its growth rate, and the
government seemed to delegate it selectively. By the preferred fixed effects estimate of
growth model, AUTONOMY would raise the productivity level by 6%, and boost its
growth rate by 2.9%. The results are also quite robust. The random effects estimates
indicate that the government selectively delegated production autonomy: compared to
20eventually-undelegated firms, the eventually-delegated firms had a 11.4% lower
productivity level ex ante; once the delegation was made, however, they caught up with
the eventually-undelegated firms by improving their productivity levels and growth rates.
Another indication of the importance of production autonomy is S_PLANQUAN,21
which was negatively and significantly related to productivity. All these findings support
hypothesis 3: delegated authority over production does improve productivity and growth
rates.
The decentralization of wage control rights is also found to affect both the level
and growth rate of productivity, just as predicted by hypothesis 2.  By FE estimates the
delegation of managerial wage discretion (W_DISCRETION) improved the productivity
level by 7.6%, and its growth rate by 3.4%. While impressive in magnitude, these
numbers are also robust.  The RE estimates suggest that W_DISCRETION was randomly
delegated after controlling for the rest of the variables. We also find that firm-level pay
sensitivity (W_ELASTICITY) robustly enhance the productivity level. Yet this wage
control rights was not found to affect the growth rate of the productivity: in an
exploratory regression, we interacted the firm-level pay sensitivity with the time since
this right was implemented, and found it to be insignificant.
The adoption of CRS, often thought to be the most important reform for SOEs,
did not significantly affect productivity. Note that the effects of CRS measured here are
net of the firm-level pay sensitivity.  We find no evidence that the adoption itself (without
the firm-level wage incentives) either improved the productivity or the growth rate.
Further, the firms chose to adopt CRS selectively: compared to firms eventually without
CRS, the firms eventually under CRS had a 19.3% higher productivity ex ante. Though
insignificant, the coefficients of the interaction term of CRS and time are negative in both
2'The  share of the frm's output  under the government's  mandatory  plan.
21FE and RE effects models, implying a negative impact of adopting CRS upon the growth
rate. These findings support hypothesis 5--because the CRS was unable to reduce
informational asymmetry and to commit firm and the government to meaningful
performance improvement, it did little to improve productivity level or growth rates.
The appointment of new managers mainly affected the growth rate but not the
level of productivity, just as suggested by hypothesis 4.  Since the level of competition
and the likely probability of managerial turnover differs among firms governed by
different levels of government, we allow both the productivity level and the growth rate
effects of appointing a new manager to differ among firms governed by the central,
provincial, prefecture, and county government.  Indeed, according to the estimates of the
growth model,  appointing new managers did not significantly affect the level for all
firms except those governed by the county government, whose productivity level dropped
by 11% in the year that the new manager was appointed. Appointing new managers
significantly improved the growth rate of all firms except those governed by the central
government: 6.3% for those governed by the provincial government, 1.3% for those
governed by the prefecture government, and 6. 1% for those governed by the county
government. These growth rate effects are by any standard quite large.  It is, perhaps,  not
surprising that appointing new managers for the firms governed by central government
affected neither the productivity level nor its growth rate; the managerial labor market
was likely to face less competition, and more replacements were likely political
appointees.
Sensitivity Analysis: Outcome, Deflator, Function Form, and Samples
Alternative measures of outcomes. The productivity measure used is value added per
capita. But what happens if the outcome measure chosen is gross value of output (GVO),
another commonly-used outcome for socialist firms? Besides being a useful sensitivity
22check, this adjustment may also shed light on how the reforms affected the traditional
measure of outcomes. When we used log(per capita GVO) as the dependent variable, we
also controlled for log(deflated costs of material inputs) in the right hand side of the
production function, and kept other variables intact.
Table 4.  Alternative Estimates of the Production Function
Dep. Var. = GVO  Dep. Var. = Value Added
The marginal retention rate  0.049**  0.109**
AUTONOMY  0.023**  0.060**
Year* AUTONOMY  0.013***  0.029***
S_PLANQUAN  -0.079***  -0.167***
WDISCRETION  0.021  0.076**
Year*WDISCRETION  0.015***  0.034***
CRS  0.024  0.018
Year*CRS  -0.0l5**  -0.022
W_ELASTICITY  0.022  0.131***
Appointing new managers for firms  insignificant  insignificant except a significantly negative
governed by all levels of  gov't  level effect for county-governed firms
Year*appointing a new manager for  0.006  -0.005
centrally-governed firms
Year*appointing a new manager for  0.014*  0.064***
provincially-governed firms
Year*appointing a new manager for  0.005*  0.022***
prefecture-governed firms
Year*appointing a new manager for  -.007  0.066***
county-governed firms
Note.  *, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%; no asterisk implies insignificance.
The estimates of this production function show that the signs of the reforms
effects are quite robust, and the magnitudes are smaller. The effects of reforms (in the
23preferred FE specification of the growth model) are as follows ( their counterparts from
the FE specification of the growth model of table 3 are in the last column):
So the reforms in general improved per capita GVO by a smaller percentage than
it improved per capita value added. This implies that the reforms in general increased
material inputs costs by a smaller percentage than they did value added,22  which, in turn,
implies that the reforms seem to have increased the incentives for saving material costs.
Deflators. We have chosen  the firm-specific output price index to deflate average
value added and fixed capital stock. One may argue that these choices were arbitrary,
especially for capital stock.  To test this objection, we tried province-specific consumer
price indices to deflate the average value added and capital stock.  The estimates of
reform effects were very similar, except that the coefficients for capital stock was
dramatically reduced. The estimates about reform effects are, it appears,  robust to the
choices of price indices.
Functional Form. We have chosen the Cobb-Douglas production function form.
To check the robustness of the estimates with respect to functional form, we re-estimate
the production functions using a translog production function-- we include in the
explanatory variables the second-order approximations of production functions, such as
22To see this,  notice  that Iog[GVO(r)J=log[V(r)+M(r)],  where  r represents  a reform, V  value  added,  and  M
material  costs.  Take  derivative  with  respect  to r, we can get:
d log(GVO)  = share of V in GVO x d log(V)+ share of M in GVO x
dr  dr  dr
for a positive  percentage  gain  of per capita GVO  from a reform  to be smaller  than the positive  percentage
gain of per capita value  added,  it is necessary  that  the percentage  increase  of M be smaller  than that of per
capita value  added. Note that  the two shares  add up to 1.
24(In k),  (In L),  (In k)(ln L), and second-order polynomials of job shares.  Again, the
estimates, both for the level effects and growth rate effects,  are robust to changes in the
form of the production function: the magnitudes and significance levels of these reform
effects were very close, while the R squares increased minimally (less than one percent).
Used Samples. We have imputed several reform variables: mainly the marginal
retention rate, S_PLANQUAN, and the input price index. The estimates of reform effects
may, therefore, be sensitive to the imputation method. Based on sensitivity analysis on
the growth specification (which, again,  fits the data the best), we conclude that the
reform effects are robust.
The most stringent test (in terms of the used sample) is when we delete all those
observations from the sample if any of the reform variables are missing.  This method
eliminates 71% of the actual used sample. Using the remaining 29%, we find that the
level effects of the reforms weakened somewhat. A few variables become insignificant
including W_DISCRETION and W_ELASTICITY. However, robust level effects are
observed for CRS, the marginal retention rate, and S_PLANQUAN. Moreover, for the
reforms that have significant rate effects in the full sample regression, the estimates of the
rate effects are still significant;  in fact, they become a bit stronger in magnitudes. The
firms governed by the central government now also significantly improved their
productivity growth rates.
When we delete only those observations where the marginal retention rate is
missing (40% of the used sample remains), the results are similar to the estimates above,
25except that the level effects of AUTONOMY becomes insignificant, though its growth
rate effects are stronger than in the full-sample estimation.
When we delete only observations where S_PLANQUAN is missing (66% of
6712 observations remains), or when we delete only observations where the input price
index is missing (83% of the used sample remains), the estimates are very similar to the
full-sample analysis.
The endogeneity of capital and labor.  The rules governing labor and capital
allocations of Chinese SOEs in the 1  980s did not change much. However, to check the
possibility that the reform effects are inconsistent because capital and labor allocations
are correlated with the unobservable ui,, we include the initial value of capital and labor
in the production function. The initial capital and labor should be free of
contemporaneous bias caused by the correlation with the unobservable. These new
estimates of reform effects are also very similar to those reported in table 3.
Growth Accounting Results Based on Model (2)
What accounted for the productivity growth of state enterprises in the 1  980s? Using the
23 conventional growth-accounting method,  table 5 reports the accounting results based on
23Growth accounting  is conducted as follows.  Let
y 1 , =a'  Xi, +'Z 1 , +m'  m_7Z,  +uj,
where Xi, is a vector of variables  which do not have missing observations in the sample, Zi, a vector whose
element  has missing observations,  and m_Zj,  a vector of dummy  variables whose value is I  if the corresponding
elements  of Zi, are missing. Then over the period of (0, ...,  T) the change in Xi,  contributes to a change in Y1,  by
a  ' (XiT-  X,,)  and Zi,k  to change in Y1,  by
P k (47W  ZiOk ) +  a  k  n  (m§_  ZiT  m  Ziok)
where 8k.  is the coefficient  of m_Zi,k
26Table 5.  The Growth-Accounting Results of Chinese SOEs: 1980-89 a
CHANGE  OF ln(AVERAGE  VALUE  ADDED)  .26
Total Contributions  to change  in ln(average  value added) from:  Based  on Model  (2)
Conventional  Factors:  -.107
Capital-labor  ratio  .006
Number  of employees  -.028
Mix of  jobs as engineers,  management  personnel,  and production  workers  -.013
Input price index  -.072
Change  of Management:  .097
The firm was governed  by the central  gov't, and had new manager  .005
Yearx(a  firm  was governed  by the central  gov't, and had new manager)  -.002
The firm was governed  by the provincial  gov't, and had new manager  -.001
Yearx(a  firm  was governed  by the provincial  gov't, and had new  manager) .023
The firm  was governed  by the prefecture  government,  and had new  -.017
manager
Yearx(a firm  was governed  by the prefecture  gov't, and had new manager)  .071
The firm  was governed  by the county  gov't, and had new manager  -.009
Yearx(a  firm  was governed  by the county  gov't, and had new manager)  .027
Marginal  Profit  Retention  Rate  .008
Wage  Control  Rights  .109
W_DISCRETION  .026
W_DISCRETIONx(year  since the manager  had W_DISCRETION)  .039
W_ELASTICITY  .044
CRSb  -.033
Share of firms under Management  Responsibility  System  (CRS)  .016
CRSx(year  since  the firm adopted  CRS)  -.049
Decentralization  of production  decision  rights:  .132
Share of output  under  the government's  mandatory  planc  .006
Share of firms whose  managers  had autonomy  .036
Autonomyx(year  since  the manager  had autonomy)  .090
Changes  of Institutional  Arrangements  in total:  > 0.109
a Based  on  FE estimates  of  the growth  model.
b  The  effects  of CRS  are  the  total  effects  of adopting  CRS  net  of the  incentive  effects  associated  with
firm-level  pay sensitivity,  part  of the  CRS  package.  If we include  the  effects  of pay  sensitivity,  then  the
total  effects  of CRS  is 0.011.
'  This  variable  is observed  only  until  1984,  showing  almost  no change  from  1984  to 89.  Its small
positive  magnitude  reflects  a small  change  of this  variable  between  1984  and 1989.
27FE specification of model 2.24  The figures reported are evaluated at the means of the
sample on which table 3 was based.
We find that the conventional factors did  not enhance productivity overall.
Capital accumulation increased average productivity only by 0.6%, and the expansion of
labor force itself actually reduced labor productivity by 2.8%. The increasing share of
average employees in the category of management personnel and "other employees"
reduced productivity by an additional 1.3%. The increasing share of inputs purchased
through the market reduced average productivity by 7.2%.
The growth accounting results clearly demonstrate that the productivity growth
came mainly from decentralizing management. New management improved the average
productivity by an impressive 9.9%. Furthermore,  the decentralization of  wage
controls--W_DISCRETION and W_ELASTICITY--further contributed to a productivity
increase of 10.9%. This demonstrates the importance of  employee incentives, and the
extent to which employees shirk when the government controls their wages. Finally, the
decentralization of production decision rights--AUTONOMY, and decreased
S_PLANQUAN--improved productivity by 13.2% percent.
The growth accounting results do not support the conventional wisdom about the
importance of decentralizing cash flow rights of firms. The increased marginal retention
rates accounted for only 0.8% of productivity growth, an effect far below those associated
with decentralizing management.
24We have also  conducted  growth-accounting  based on baseline  model,  and obtained  similar  results.
28The government did not accomplish much in its attempts to push CRS: in fact, the
adoption of CRS itself reduced the productivity by 3.3%; if we include the effects of
W_ELASTICITY (a component of CRS), CRS improved the productivity by 1.1%. It is
clear that CRS itself (net of the effects of firm-level pay sensitivity) did not contribute to
the productivity growth in the 1  980s, a result consistent with hypothesis 5.
Adding up the effects of the decentralized reforms, we find that the reforms were
significant sources of the productivity increase: while productivity actually increased by
26% over this period, the decentralized reforms (including CRS, the wage controls, the
marginal retention rate, S_PLANQUAN, AUTONOMY) accounted for a productivity
increase of 10.9% (42% of the total productivity change). This 42% is likely to be the
lower bound of the contribution from the reforms, for we do not include any of the new
management effects in the category of the reform effects. It appears that part of the
management turnover was a byproduct of reforms--the rate of management turnover
seems to be positively correlated with CRS, AUTONOMY, W_DISCRETION and the
marginal retention rate, so management turnover was, perhaps, partly a byproduct of the
reforms hence its effects should be partly attributed to the reform effects.  Since we do
not know how much of the management turnover was due to the reforms, we stop short of
dividing new management effects between reforms and conventional factors.
V.  CONCLUSION
This study examines how a rich set of decentralized reforms of Chinese SOEs
affected the productivity level and growth.  It is a serious attempt to examine rich aspects
29of the organization of the firm, and study both their static and dynamic effects. Using
variations of ownership and control rights in the Chinese SOEs in the 1980s, we find:
1. It is useful to distinguish among different components of ownership and control
rights.
2. It is important to examine both the dynamic and static effects of each reform. It
appears that the dynamic effects are more important than the static effects in magnitude.
This finding supports the idea that it is important to take into account the dynamic effects
of ownership (Ehrlich et al., 1994).
3. The decentralized reforms of Chinese SOEs in the 1  980s significantly raised
the productivity level and growth rate.  Especially effective reforms were those that
spurred incentives for working hard and accumulating human capital: appointing new
managers, using firm-level pay sensitivity, letting managers determine wages, and
allowing managers to make production decisions. These findings imply that managers are
better decision-makers than bureaucrats, that shirking prevails in centralized firms, and,
therefore, that SOE reforms should strengthen managers' and employees'  incentives to
work hard and learn.  Adopting CRS and raising profit retention rates, probably the most
important reforms as viewed by the Chinese government and many scholars, did not
improve productivity much; in fact, we have weak evidence that CRS might have reduced
productivity growth.
4.  The results appear to be robust with respect to the choices of functional form
of the production function, the use of alternative deflators, the adoption of alternative
samples, and whether or not we treat capital and labor as a function of decentralized
reforrns.
5. It is important to take into account the selectivity associated with each reform.
In particular, better-performing firms appear to have adopted CRS more readily;  poorly-
performing SOEs were more likely to be granted managerial wage discretion.
30Appendix:  A.1. Incidences  of Missing Observations  of Used Variables
Variables  Incidence of missing
observation ( %).:
Firm age  3.5
Input price index of the firm 25 16.9
Job mix of engineers, workers, and management personnel  10.0
Marginal profit retention rate  59.6
W_ELASTICITY  2.5
S_PLANQUAN: share of output under the mandatory plan of the government 26 33.7
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